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 This dissertation proposes a simple computerized game to serve as a pure test of backward 
induction and then tests the game in the laboratory.  One of the fundamental assumptions of neoclassical 
economic theory is that human beings function as fully rational agents who maximize their utility over 
multidimensional alternatives under economic constraints.  However, numerous studies have shown 
systematic deviation from rational decision making in a laboratory setting.  While no single explanation is 
obvious for this suboptimal behavior, the literature suggests other motivations (besides maximizing utility) 
may be at play, including reciprocity, trust, reputation, and welfare.  The ―Race to 21‖ game we test 
renders these other-regarding preferences irrelevant; therefore we call it a ―pure‖ test of backward 
induction. 
 
 Chapter one introduces the game, as well as tests the effect of adding incentive payments in several 
places along the path of play.  Chapter two continues by analyzing how each different intermediate 
incentive affects the speed of learning in the game.  Chapter three concludes with a look at whether 
individual differences among laboratory subjects explain some of our experimental results.  Common to 
all chapters is the result that incentive payments offered on the subgame perfect equilibrium path near the 
midpoint of the game particularly enhance the use of backward induction among subjects.
vi 
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CHAPTER ONE:  CAN PLACEMENT OF INCENTIVES WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF A RACE GAME 
ENHANCE BACKWARD INDUCTION? 
1. Introduction 
  
In economics, as in life, we tend to assume agents make decisions only after careful consideration 
of the choices available, the chances afforded by nature, and the outcomes that are possible as a result.  In 
fact, the fundamental assumption of neoclassical economic analysis is that human beings function as fully 
rational agents who maximize their utility over multidimensional alternatives under economic constraints.  
Most real-world decisions require multiple stages of actions, events, and consequences that are inherently 
complex.  As a result, no single explanation is obvious for the deviations from optimality we observe in the 
experimental laboratory.  Plausible explanations include cognitive limitation, incomplete specification, 
information availability (or lack of), and attitudes toward risk, among others.   
 One such deviation from rationality we see is the failure of individuals to use backward induction in 
decision making tasks.  Backward induction involves solving first for optimal behavior at the ―end‖ of a 
game, and then determining what optimal behavior is earlier in the game given the anticipation of this later 
behavior.  Many studies attribute backward induction failures to bounded rationality
1
.  Nevertheless, 
others have shown that some notion of training or experience actually increases the propensity for subjects 
to backward induct.  To that end, Kagel and Levin (1999) showed that ―super-experienced‖ subjects 
behaved differently than inexperienced.  Likewise, in a field experiment whereby baseball cards were 
auctioned at a trade show, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) found that dealers, who commonly participate in 
auctions, bid more strategically than nondealers.  Further, Levitt et al. (2008) show that chess 
grandmasters are able to use backward induction in simple decision tasks
2
.  Finally, Johnson et al. (2002) 
concluded that untrained subjects deviate from equilibrium as a result of limited look ahead (vs. backward 
                                                          
1
 For example, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Busemeyer et al. (2000), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta 
(2001), Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002), and Johnson and Busemeyer (2001).  
2
 Another notable exception is Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008). 
2 
induction), and that training them in backward induction draws them far closer to equilibrium (though, 
curiously, not all the way). 
To attempt an explanation ourselves of the seemingly irrational behavior commonly observed in 
the laboratory, we implement a zero-sum game called Race to 21, whereby two players take turns choosing 
numbers that are added in sequence until one reaches the sum 21.  This game is not new or unique to our 
set of experiments; in fact, we know of several experimentalists who have used variations on this game to 
test various aspects of learning, strategic sophistication, bounded rationality, and backward induction
3
.  
Given that most previous empirical work shows that people tend not to behave rationally (at least in the 
lab), the challenge is to structure a game in such a way that we may elicit rational backward induction.  Our 
game is both different from and preferable to those games others have used to test for backward induction in 
the laboratory setting in that we employ ―teaser‖ payments both on and off the equilibrium path of play to 
see whether and how incentives impact an individual’s ability to backward induct.  Additionally, we test 
two strategy space choice sets that are different from those previously tested
4
, and our subjects play against 
an emotionless computer opponent so that deviations from the optimal path are automatically punished
5
.  
We find that subjects more often solve the game when offered incentive payments for staying on the 
equilibrium path (more specifically, when offered an incentive near the midpoint of the game) than when 
they play the baseline game with no teaser payments.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows.  Section 2 outlines previous related literature.  
Section 3 describes our experimental design, including a detailed description of the game, subject pool, and 
laboratory procedure.  In section 4, we make predictions based on theory and discuss their implications.  
We present our empirical results in section 5, and section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2008); Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov (2007), Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford (2006), and Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler (2008). 
4
 Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2008) test strategy spaces (1-9) and (1-10), Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler (2008) test 
strategy space (1-2).  We test strategy spaces (1-3) and (1-4), as do Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov (2007). 
5
 Similar to Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon’s (2002) ―robot‖ players. 
3 
2. Related Literature 
 
Decision theory, a complex body of knowledge that has been studied by economists, 
mathematicians, and psychologists for over 40 years, has proven useful to economic theorizing in several 
ways.  Certainly, if we can describe what variables affect decisions, we can attempt to prescribe how 
decisions should be made.   The major dichotomy that exists in decision theory is that between normative 
and positive disciplines.  The vast majority of the prior work in decision theory falls under the normative 
heading, i.e., concerned with how people should make decisions in theory (for a comprehensive review of 
the classic literature, see S. O. Hansson, 2005, and Bell et al., 1988).  These theoretically-oriented studies 
are useful to the extent that they suggest tools, methodologies, and software interfaces to help people make 
better decisions.   
Since it is obvious that human beings do not always behave optimally, the positive, or descriptive, 
discipline consists of tests of actual behavior against the predictions of the aforementioned theoretical 
models.  Most of this work, though smaller in volume than its normative counterpart, has exploded since 
the mid-20
th
 century as experiments became infinitely easier to administer with the proliferation of 
computer technology.  There is a growing body of experimental literature that studies the principles that 
govern both strategic behavior and individual decision making, surveyed in both Kagel and Roth (1995) 
and Crawford et al. (1997).  Historically, most applications of individual decision and strategic game 
theories assumed equilibrium strategies selected by backward induction in their predictions.  Backward 
induction, one of the most important solution concepts in game theory, relies on a set of commonly 
accepted economic assumptions; namely, that individuals are rational and have common knowledge that all 
other individuals are rational as well (Aumann, 1995).  Despite its widespread theoretical application, 
empirical evidence suggests that economic agents may engage in backward induction less frequently than 
the theory would predict.  In fact, nearly all laboratory experiment results indicate people are not able to 
backward induct successfully; see, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Busemeyer et al. (2000), 
4 
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Johnson et al. (2002), and Johnson and Busemeyer (2001).  These deviations 
from equilibrium are often explained by social preferences (G. E. Bolton and A. Ockenfels, 2000; E. Fehr 
and K. M. Schmidt, 1999), risk attitudes (R. P. Cubitt et al., 1998; D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, 1979), or 
failures of rationality.  By far the most often cited and generally accepted explanation for bounded 
rationality is the practical reality that humans have finite computational resources available for decision 
making; in fact, Rapoport (1975) shows that human beings may be capable of planning only two or three 
stages ahead.  Seminal bodies of work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Fischhoff, Slovic, and 
Lichtenstein (1978) introduced useful rules of thumb, or heuristics, to overcome the strict rigidity of 
optimization required by rational agent models.  More recently, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004) and 
others have suggested that allowing structured boundedly rational decision rules in some of these 
applications can resolve the apparent contradiction between theory and observation. 
 If perfect backward induction yields the optimal solution, and the literature suggests people don’t 
actually use backward induction unless trained, might we be able to improve outcomes by using incentives 
to help guide individuals to the subgame perfect equilibrium path identified by backward induction?  This 
study is our contribution to the larger literature on the propensity of people to actually use backward 
induction. 
3. Experimental Design 
 
The “Race to 21” game 
 While much of the experimental literature tests whether subjects use backward induction in 
strategic settings such as bilateral bargaining, centipede, and prisoner’s dilemma games, these games 
actually may be testing a host of motivations other than backward induction (e.g. reciprocity, trust, 
welfare, etc.). The ―Race to 21‖ game we studied (a variation on Levitt, List, and Sadoff’s (2008) Race 
to 100 game), by contrast, serves as a pure test of backward induction. In the baseline Race to 21 game, 
5 
a human subject plays opposite a computer opponent.  The human and computer alternately choose 
numbers within a given range (strategy space 1-3 or 1-4, inclusive) which are then added in sequence.  
In the 1-3 version, perfect backward induction yields a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of 
choosing ―1‖, then on subsequent turns selecting whatever number sums to 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21.  In the 
1-4 game, the subgame perfect equilibrium path is 1, 6, 11, 16, and 21.  The computer is programmed 
to make random selections within the given action space, unless the human subject chooses a number 
that takes him off the equilibrium path of play.  In that case, the computer will move to the equilibrium 
path for the remainder of the game, rendering a victory for the human subject impossible.  Our setup 
guarantees a first-mover advantage; therefore the human player always makes his selection first.  Play 
continues until either the human or the computer chooses a number that makes the sequence sum to 21. 
This player is the winner and receives a predetermined payoff of 100 points while the loser receives 
nothing.  Race to 21 is a zero-sum game; therefore it allows us to isolate the test for backward induction 
while disregarding any assumptions on social preferences or beliefs about other players. 
Since the point of this experiment is to test the effect of incentives on backward induction, we 
complicate the baseline treatment by adding what we call ―teaser‖ payments at various points along the 
equilibrium path of play.  Subjects are offered an additional 50 points for choosing a number that yields a 
sum of, for example, 13 during the course of play.  If the action space is 1-3, the teaser payment for landing 
on 13 serves as an incentive to stay on the equilibrium path, and the subject earns 150 points.  When the 
action space is 1-4, a teaser payment at 13 could serve as a distraction from the equilibrium path; if he 
chases the teaser in this case, the subject sacrifices the larger payoff of 100 for the intermediate teaser 
payoff of 50.  To isolate whether the subject is actually chasing the teaser, we test the teaser treatments on 
and off the equilibrium path, as well as early in the game and nearer the middle of the game, against a 
control treatment with no teaser.  The computer is programmed such that if the human subject is on the 
equilibrium path the computer plays randomly, unless it can grab the teaser, in which case it does. 
6 
Subject Pool 
We recruited approximately 200 undergraduate students during the summer of 2009 at the 
University of Tennessee-Knoxville (UT).  The UT economics department recruits generically for 
experiments through the existence of a database called the Online Recruiting System for Economic 
Experiments (ORSEE).  Currently, there are 1,543 students registered in ORSEE; of those, we invited 
1,512 to register for the Race to 21 experiment.  Invitees received an e-mail describing the task as ―a 
market experiment … [in which] earnings are determined by the decisions you make.‖  We had 212 
students register, and 199 actually showed up to participate.  Academic majors represented were quite 
diverse, including liberal and fine arts, business, social and hard sciences, education, and nursing. 
Experimental Procedure 
The experiment sessions took place in the UT Experimental Economics Laboratory.  The lab is set 
up with 27 individual client workstations (Dell PCs) networked to an intranet server.  Study carrel walls 
separate each workstation to maintain subjects’ privacy.  Subjects remained anonymous to each other and 
their decisions remained private throughout the experiment.   
The Race to 21 game is programmed in Perl
6
, a highly flexible general-purpose dynamic 
programming language.  Perl allows the subject in the lab to play the game via an html interface, and 
records the subject’s and computer’s decisions to a text file for analysis.  The flexibility inherent in the 
program allowed us to make quick parameter changes between lab sessions to accommodate all 10 teaser 
treatments. 
At the start of each lab session, experimenters gave subjects a copy of written instructions for the 
game to complement the same instructions visible on the participants’ computer screens.  Subjects were 
asked to follow along as experimenters read the instructions aloud.  During each lab session, subjects 
                                                          
6
 Special thanks to Dr. Mike Shor at Vanderbilt University for programming our game. 
7 
played two Race to 21 games; game one consisted of 30 rounds of either action space 1-3 or 1-4, while 
game two consisted of 15 rounds of the action space that was not played in the first game
7
.  The decision 
task was framed as one of maximizing earnings by removing between 1 and 3 (or 1 and 4) numbered stones, 
alternating with the computer opponent, until all 21 stones were removed from the screen.  Figure 1 shows 




Subjects were told they earned points when they, and not the computer, removed the green stones.  
The boldface numbers on the green stones represent the points they earned for removing those stones.  
Players removed stones by mousing over the stones they wanted to remove (which highlighted them on the 
screen), and then clicking on the last stone in the series they wanted to remove.  Participants were given the 
opportunity to practice with the interface and ask questions before actual play began.  All navigation 
through the pages of the experiment occurred by clicking a button at the bottom of each screen labeled 
―Proceed‖.  At the completion of the final round of game two, we asked subjects to complete a short 
questionnaire.  Immediately following the experiment, we paid subjects their earnings privately in cash.  
Payments were calculated at the rate of $1 per 150 points.  Please see Appendix B for a copy of the written 
instructions, screen shots for all phases of the experiment, and the questionnaire. 
Each lab session represented one of 10 different treatment parameters.  Table 1 summarizes the 10 
treatments we tested in game one. 
4. Hypotheses 
Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2008) found in their Race to 100 game that simply changing the action 
space from (1-9) to (1-10) dramatically reduced the share of subjects who fully backward induct from 
nearly sixty percent to less than fifteen percent—a striking result given their subject pool consisted of chess 
                                                          
7
 Only the results of game one are reported in this essay. 
8
 All figures and tables may be found in Appendix A. 
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grandmasters with extensive experience in backward induction.  To explore whether the same 
phenomenon occurs with less experienced student subjects, we test each teaser against both action spaces 
(1-3) and (1-4).  Theoretically, it’s unclear which of these should make backward induction easier.  
Asking a subject to choose a number between one and three in a race to 21 leaves him with five decision 
nodes to contend with, and three options at each node.  Conversely, selecting from one to four leaves him 
with only four decision nodes, but four options to choose from at each node.  Whether backward induction 
is easier with fewer decision nodes to the end of the game but more options at each node, or fewer options to 
choose from at each node but more total nodes to analyze, remains an empirical question. 
To determine the optimal placement of an incentive within the structure of a race game, we also test 
teasers placed early in the game and near the midpoint of the game against games with no teasers.  A 
midpoint teaser might enhance backward induction by shortening the game for the subject.  In the extreme 
case, an on-equilibrium teaser at the midpoint of the game, e.g. on 11 in the (1-4) game, may effectively turn 
the four-node race to 21 game into two separate subgames of two nodes each.  Then the subject need only 
backward induct two moves at a time from the end of the each subgame, lessening his cognitive burden 
relative to one longer game.  Alternatively, encountering a teaser on one of the first several stones in the 
game could function to entice a forward-looking subject to get on the equilibrium path of play earlier in the 
game, increasing the probability that a subject will win the game.  We will look at the data from several 
different angles in an attempt to parse these effects. 
For obvious reasons, placing a teaser on the equilibrium path should make backward induction 
easier than in games with no teaser.  By offering an extra fifty points for taking the teaser along the way, 
subjects have an even greater incentive to make the ―right‖ decision at every node.  Predicting the effect of 
an off-equilibrium teaser payment is a more difficult exercise.  On one hand, the off-equilibrium teaser 
effectively shortens the game in the same manner as described above, which should make the game easier to 
solve by backward induction.  On the other hand, this teaser takes the subject off the equilibrium path of 
9 
play.  Since the computer program punishes any deviation from equilibrium in the context of our Race to 
21 game, we might expect that backward induction is made more difficult by this effect relative to control 
treatments with no teaser.  Again, we’ll use emprics to help us determine which of these effects dominates. 
To sum up, relative to a game with no teasers, we predict on-equilibrium teasers to enhance 
backward induction.  For the reasons outlined above, off-equilibrium teasers, early and mid-game teasers, 
and differences in action space may either enhance or detract from learning via backward induction.  We 
will use the results of our laboratory experiment to draw conclusions regarding the empirical questions. 
5. Results 
  
Due to capacity constraints in the lab, technical glitches resulting from data transfer, and the failure 
of a few subjects to follow directions, we report the results from 179 individual subjects (out of the 199 who 
showed up to participate).  Subjects earned $18.91 on average, with a median payment of $18.08, and 
mode of $5 (the minimum payoff regardless of performance on the task).  We conducted a total of 12 
sessions over June and July 2009.   
Before it is possible to analyze the effects of teasers on backward induction, first it is necessary to 
establish that subjects are actually able to backward induct.  We begin with the question of whether or not 
subjects use backward induction in the simple (no teaser) Race to 21 game.  Table 2 presents results on the 
probabilities of remaining on the equilibrium path of play at each node, conditional upon reaching that 
node.  Rows correspond to the action space tested, and columns correspond to each different decision 
node, working backward from the end of the game.  Just beneath each node’s description in the first row 
are the relevant ―key numbers‖ on the equilibrium path of play for each action space version (in 
parentheses).  Equilibrium play dictates that exactly five decision nodes will be reached in the (1-3) game, 
while only four nodes are required in equilibrium for the (1-4) game. 
 The first column of Table 2 tells us that of the 360 observations on the (1-3) version of the Race to 
10 
21 game, 96% successfully solved the game if they arrived on the final equilibrium node; i.e., of the 
subjects who chose a number on their penultimate move that summed to seventeen, 96% selected the 
number that summed to 21 on their next move.  Likewise, conditional on reaching the key number sixteen 
on their penultimate move in the (1-4) version, 97% of subjects will win the game.  An alternative way of 
interpreting these results is this:  46% of subjects made the ―right‖ first move to remain on the equilibrium 
path in the (1-3) game.  Of those, 58% chose a number that added up to 5 on their next move.  Of those 
subjects who still remained on the equilibrium path at node ―Final-3‖, 81% continued to the following 
equilibrium node, and so on.  These results indicate that at least some subjects are able to backward induct 
in the Race to 21 game absent distracting teaser payments.  We will compare all subsequent treatments to 
this baseline in order to draw conclusions regarding teaser effects on backward induction. 
 Table 3 shows the percentage of all rounds played that subjects won for each experimental 
condition.  Recall that each of 179 subjects played thirty rounds of the same game, four different teaser 
locations were tested (on-early, on-mid, off-early, and off-mid), and two different action space conditions 
were tested (1-3 and 1-4) for each teaser location, for a total of 5,370 unique observations.  In order to win 




The intersection of the first row and first column of Table 3 indicates that subjects win the game in 
which the teaser falls on the equilibrium path and early in the game 45% of the time when the action space 
is (1-3), and 41% of the time when the action space is (1-4).  For ease of exposition, we first aggregate the 
above results for whether the teaser payment falls on the equilibrium path, early or near the middle of the 
game, and whether the action space presented is (1-3) or (1-4).  Then we break the aggregate results down 
further to support our conclusions.  Our analysis leads to the following insight: 
RESULT 1:   Teaser payments that fall on the equilibrium path of play make backward induction easier 
                                                          
9
 The probability of winning just by chance is 0.0041 in the (1-3) game and 0.0039 in the (1-4) game. 
11 
relative to games with no teasers. 
In Table 4, we pool the data from Table 3 to compare the on-equilibrium teaser condition to the 
no-teaser condition.  Subjects win games when a teaser payment falls on the equilibrium path 52% of the 
time, more than doubling the probability of winning 25% of the time when no teaser payment exists.  This 
relationship is true regardless of whether the teaser occurs early in the game or nearer the middle. 
To complement this analysis, we test the linear probability specification
10
 of a binary regression 
model of the form 
𝑃 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽3 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽4 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where P(winit) equals one if subject i wins the game in round t and zero otherwise, and the regressors 
represent interactions between categorical dummy variables.  The regressors should be interpreted as 
follows: ―on‖ is really the ―on*mid‖ interaction, and ―off‖ is really ―off*mid‖.  To glean the marginal 
effect of the on-early teaser condition it is necessary to sum the coefficients on the ―on‖ and ―on*early‖ 
regressors, and likewise for the ―off‖ and ―off*early‖ interaction coefficients.  Empirical results are 
reported in Table 5, which presents the marginal effects associated with a change in each of the regressors 
relative to the control (no-teaser) condition.   
This model explains 11% of the variation in the data set.  The coefficients on the independent 
variables tell us that relative to the observed probability of winning over all treatments (36%), presenting 
the subject with an on-mid teaser increases the probability of winning by 34%, holding all other variables in 
the model constant.  Likewise, putting the teaser on the equilibrium path but early in the game increases 
the probability of winning by 18% (.34-.16=.18) relative to the overall probability of winning, ceteris 
paribus.  It should be noted that the default treatment for the regression, the no-teaser case, corresponds to 
                                                          
10
 A potential drawback of this model is that the estimated coefficients can imply probabilities outside the unit interval 
[0,1].  For this reason, the marginal effects probit model is often used instead.  After running the regressions using 
both linear probability and marginal effects probit using Stata, the coefficients we found were almost identical in each 
and predicted probabilities never fell outside the unit interval.  This is probably attributed to having a very large data 
set. 
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the constant term.  These results corroborate our earlier conclusion that on-equilibrium teasers are better 
than no teasers at all. 
 Finally, as a test of robustness we can look at subjects’ average earnings across treatments.  
On-equilibrium treatments result in average earnings per participant of 1,763 points ($11.75), after backing 
out the teaser payment of 50 points for each round won.  This is indeed much greater than the 717.86 points 
($4.79) earned on average in the no-teaser setting, and the difference is statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level.   
 Now that we’ve established that on-equilibrium teasers outperform no-teaser treatments, further 
exploration into the data leads to the following result: 
RESULT 2:  Teaser payments presented near the midpoint of the game yield better results than those 
offered near the beginning of the game—but only if those teasers are simultaneously on the equilibrium 
path. 
 In Table 6, again we aggregate the data on mid- and early-game teasers from Table 3 and compare 
to the aggregated no-teaser treatment results.  Subjects win games 39% of the time when a teaser occurs 
near the midpoint of the game, and 35% of the time when they find teasers early in the game.  While both 
aggregate measures are significantly better than the no-teaser treatment, it is obvious from Table 3 that this 
result is driven by the teaser falling simultaneously on the equilibrium path.  This merely reinforces the 
conclusions drawn in Result 1 above. 
 Probing this result further, we re-examine the linear probability model introduced in the previous 
section.  In comparing the regression coefficients of on-mid to on-early teasers, it is clear that the midpoint 
teaser yields wins nearly twice as often as when the teaser is presented early in the game (34% and 18%, 
respectively).  Examining the off-equilibrium equivalents reveals that a midpoint teaser payment actually 
reduces the probability of winning the game when it occurs off the equilibrium path of play by 8%, while 
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the off-early teaser has almost no effect (0.2%) on the probability of winning the game.   
 As in the previous section, we now check average earnings for all subjects across experimental 
conditions to provide further evidence for our result.  Subjects playing games with on-mid teasers earn 
1,793.62 points ($11.96) on average, after accounting for the extra fifty points per game available in this 
setting.  This is slightly better than the 1,732.32 points ($11.55) earned on average by those playing games 
with on-early teasers.  In contrast, when the teaser is presented off the equilibrium path, subjects facing 
teasers early in the game fare slightly better than those who see teasers closer to the middle; in fact, they 
earn an average of 721.68 points ($4.81) and 523.62 points ($3.49) respectively.  This comparison 
reinforces the result that mid-game teasers outperform early game teasers if the teaser also happens to occur 
on the equilibrium path of play. 
 Our final insight concerning the effect that variation in the structure of the Race to 21 game has on 
backward induction involves the strategy space a player faces: 
RESULT 3:  Backward induction is made easier with fewer decision nodes, even if there are more choices to 
analyze at each node. 
To see this, first we pool the number of rounds won over all of the (1-3) and (1-4) strategy space treatments, 
respectively, from Table 3.  This gives us the proportions shown in Table 7.  On the whole, subjects win 
games where they choose from one to four at each of four decision nodes 38% of the time, versus 33% of 
the time for those games in which subjects choose from one to three at each of five nodes.  The data here 
suggest that it is the number of decision nodes the player faces, rather than the strategy space at each node, 
which better predicts performance in backward induction tasks. 
 To lend further credence to this result, we break out the action space results by teaser treatment in a 
marginal effects probit model: 
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𝑃 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽2 𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽4 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 
+ 𝛽6 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽7 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽8 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽9 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 
+ 𝛽10 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where P(winit) again refers to the binary outcome (1 if subject i wins the final stone in round t, 0 otherwise), 
and the regressors represent interactions among categorical dummies.  As in the previous linear probability 
model, the coefficients must be appropriately combined to interpret the marginal effects of each teaser 
condition on the probability of winning the final stone.  Stata gives us the raw output in Table 8.  Recall 
that to interpret the marginal effects by treatment, we sum the coefficients as seen in Table 9 (using the 
alphabetical references to the regressors from Table 8).  The cells in Table 9 correspond to the marginal 
effects of each teaser treatment relative to the no-teaser control condition within the same strategy space.  
For instance, having an on-early teaser in a (1-3) action space game increases the probability that a subject 
will win the game by 31% over the (1-3) game with no teaser.  The third row in Table 9 is the most useful 
in providing further evidence in favor of Result 3.  While the games played with on-early and off-mid 
teasers did not have statistically different outcomes based on action space, subjects won the on-mid teaser 
games 10% more often when asked to select from one to four stones, and they won the off-early teaser 
games 28% more often when tasked with strategy space (1-4). 
 In sum, we find that backward induction in the Race to 21 game is made easier by placement of 
on-equilibrium teasers near the middle of the game, and especially so when a subject has to contend with 
fewer decision nodes between the root and terminal node. 
6. Conclusion 
  
In this study, we introduce undergraduate student subjects to a controlled laboratory experiment in 
a pure test of backward induction.  Making use of our Race to 21 game, we report several insights.  We 
find that these subjects exhibit the ability to strategically backward induct substantially greater than random 
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chance would explain.  Further, we find that incentives placed within the structure of the game affect 
whether subjects are more or less likely to win the game depending on their location; specifically, subjects 
offered teaser payments on the equilibrium path near the midpoint of the game win more than twice as often 
as when they play the same game with no teaser available.  The games in which subjects were offered 
teaser payments off the equilibrium path of play show variable results depending upon whether the teaser is 
offered earlier or later in the game.  Further testing of off-equilibrium teasers should be done in order to 
draw more robust conclusions.  Finally, we find that the length of the game matters for backward 
induction.  Facing fewer nodes from beginning to end improves outcomes, regardless of the strategy space 
subjects must choose from.  
 Besides revealing these insights into incentivizing backward induction tasks, our work also offers a 
methodological contribution.  It highlights the potential for computerized laboratory experiments to 
―train‖ subjects in backward induction via punishment for deviating from optimal play.  It remains to be 
seen whether this type of training in backward induction can be generalized from one setting to another.  
We hope that future efforts will explore more fully other important dimensions of controlled laboratory 
experiments for training potential. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  DO INCENTIVES SPEED UP OR SLOW DOWN LEARNING DEPENDING ON THEIR 




In the previous chapter, we showed that human subjects are indeed capable of solving a decision 
task using backward induction techniques.  Additionally, we reported that introducing an intermediate 
incentive payment into the structure of the decision task that our subjects faced had the propensity to 
enhance or distract them from using backward induction to strategically maximize their payoff in the 
game.  Specifically, subjects playing the Race to 21 game won more than twice as often when offered 
teaser payments on the equilibrium path near the midpoint of the game as when they played the same 
game with no teaser payment available.  We further concluded that the length of the game matters for 
backward induction.  The fewer decision nodes a player has to contend with, the better the outcome. 
 The data we analyze in this essay is based on the same set of Race to 21 experiments that we used 
in the previous chapter.  Given that we know our subjects are able to use backward induction to solve 
simple decision tasks such as those presented here, we test whether intermediate incentive payments 
affect the speed with which a subject learns the optimal path of play based on where the incentive is 
located within the structure of the game.  We predict that the same conditions which were advantageous 
for backward induction in the first chapter will also prove to induce the fastest learning from one round to 
the next.  Specifically, we hypothesize that on-equilibrium teasers will outperform off-equilibrium 
teasers, and that a teaser offered near the midpoint of the game will result in faster learning if it is 
simultaneously on the equilibrium path of play. 
Before we can definitively say which conditions speed up or slow down learning, it is necessary 
to establish appropriate methods to measure the speed of learning.  So then, what constitutes a good 
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measure of speed of learning?  In our Race to 21 game, we say a subject ―learned‖ the game when he 
wins the final stone.  Then the appropriate question is how long does it take a subject to figure out the 
path he must take to reach the final stone?  To answer this, we will count the number of rounds a subject 
plays before he is successful in winning the game in the absence of a teaser payment.  Finally, we want 
to know whether we can hasten or postpone subjects learning the optimal sequence of game play by 
offering an incentive (teaser) payment for taking an intermediate stone somewhere along the way.  After 
analyzing the data through several different methods, we find that on-equilibrium teasers offered near the 
middle of the game result in faster learning than in games in which no teaser payment is offered, and 
further, that the on-mid combination is superior to all other teaser conditions tested.   
2. Measuring the speed of learning 
  
Since we are interested in measuring how long it takes an individual to learn the optimal 
(subgame perfect equilibrium) path between the root and terminal decision nodes, a logical first place to 
start is to count the number of rounds a subject played before he first reached the final stone in the Race 
to 21 game.  In Table 10, we compare the average number of rounds subjects took to earn both the teaser 
stone and the final stone in each treatment.  The non-italicized entries represent those averages 
conditional on subjects reaching the target stone at all, while the italicized entries refer to those averages 
calculated by what we call the unconditional method, defined immediately below.  Additionally, Table 
10 contains information on the number of rounds subjects take to get the teaser stone the first and second 
time, the number of rounds they take to reach the final stone the first and second time, the fraction of 
rounds in which these target stones were taken, and statistical tests for the differences among all of these 
numbers.  Notice the no-teaser game results near the bottom of Table 10.  These serve as our control 
treatments, against which we compare the various teaser treatments in order to draw conclusions about the 
effects of different incentives on the speed of learning. 
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 From Table 10, we see that conditional on winning the game in any round, subjects who chose 
from one to three stones at each node first found the equilibrium path of play by (on average) round six of 
thirty.  However, this result might be misleading.  Only one-third of the subjects who played this 
particular treatment ever reached the final stone in the game even once, and they account for only 18% of 
all rounds played.  So using this average to measure speed of learning is probably biased downward, 
making the game appear easier to solve than it really is.  To mitigate this effect, we alternatively assume 
that for any subject who failed to win the game at least once in thirty rounds, he would have won the 
game in round 31.  This unconditional assumption is second-best; we have no way of knowing how 
many rounds the subject really would have needed, much less if he would learn the game at all.  
Nevertheless, it better reflects the ―tougher‖ nature of the decision task.  After accounting for all subjects 
who played the no-teaser games and without conditioning on having won the game by round thirty, we 
find that on average subjects took the final stone in the (1-3) game by round 23, and the subjects who 
played the (1-4) version reached the optimal path by round 20. 
 Taking a closer look at the various teaser conditions, we likewise count the number of rounds it 
took our subjects to first reach the path to take the teaser stone.  As we might expect, when the teaser 
was presented early in the game, conditional on subjects taking the teaser at all, they grabbed it in the 
very earliest rounds of the game—on average before round three
11
.  In contrast, when the teaser occurred 
near the middle of the game, subjects took several additional rounds to take the teaser (on average by 
round seven).  We begin to see more interesting patterns in the data once we compare the speed-to-teaser 
to the speed-to-final stone. 
One caveat should accompany the discussion regarding our measure of learning: 
RESULT 1:  The first time a subject takes a teaser or final stone does not necessarily constitute learning. 
                                                          
11
 For the reasons discussed in footnote 25, it is impossible for subjects to grab the teaser in the off-early (1-4) 
treatment. 
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The prior probability that a subject would select the correct move at each decision node to win the Race to 
21 game by random chance is 0.0041 in the (1-3) game and 0.0039 in the (1-4) version.  One would 
think these probabilities small enough that actually observing a subject taking the final stone is more 
likely than not evidence that learning by backward induction has taken place.  However, we have 
numerous examples in the data of a subject taking the final stone in one round, but then losing the next 
several rounds before consistently winning the final stone for the remainder of the game.  For this 
reason, we also record the second round in which subjects won either the teaser or final stone.  If the first 
time subjects take the teaser or final stone is indeed evidence of learning, then we would expect the 
second time to be the very next round.  The columns in Table 1 labeled ―deltax,‖ where x stands for 
either T (for teaser) or F (for final stone), represent the difference between the first and second times the 
subject took the teaser and final stones in each experimental condition.  These calculations demonstrate 
that subjects average between one and six rounds between their first and second successful strategies
12
.  
Testing the null hypothesis that all delta=1, we are able to reject the null in all experimental treatments.  
Taking this into consideration, we will derive an alternate measure of learning later in this essay.  But for 
now, we shall use the delta calculation to probe further the unique properties possessed by each teaser 
combination. 
In order to draw conclusions about the effects that different incentive placements have on the 
speed of learning, we calculated the difference between the first round in which our subjects took the 
teaser and the first round in which they took the final stone.  The most striking difference leads to the 
following insight: 
RESULT 2:  Finding the path to the final stone once a subject has reached the teaser stone occurs 
instantaneously for the on-mid treatment and not for any other treatment. 
                                                          
12
 Except for the on-mid treatment, which we will establish is different from the rest in Result 2. 
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From the rightmost column in Table 10, it becomes obvious that teaser payments have different 
effects on learning depending upon their position.  We can see by looking at the on-early teaser 
treatment that on average subjects need five or six additional rounds after first taking the teaser stone 
before they find the optimal path to the final stone.  In aggregate, this improves speed of learning 
relative to the no-teaser control condition by at least a couple of rounds.  However, the most striking 
difference occurs when the teaser is offered on the equilibrium path near the midpoint of the game.  In 
this case, our subjects need at most one round to find the path to the final stone after reaching the teaser.  
In fact, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the first round a subject 
found the teaser stone and the first time he reached the final stone are the same round in the on-mid teaser 
condition. 
 Further, this immediate teaser-to-win relationship is unique to the on-mid combination.  If the 
important component of this condition is the fact that the teaser falls on the equilibrium path, we should 
expect to see similar results in our on-early teaser treatment.  However, Table 10 shows that not only do 
subjects win fewer rounds in the on-early treatments, but it also takes them at least five extra rounds 
between getting the teaser and getting from the teaser to the final stone.  Likewise, the fact that there 
appears to be a big difference between learning in the off-mid setting (taking at least eight rounds to reach 
the optimal path to the final stone after taking the teaser) and in the on-mid setting tells us that learning is 
not improved just by placing a teaser in the middle of the game.   
 Looking more closely at the relationship between the first and second rounds in which subjects 
take the teaser and final stones, we are able to glean the following observation: 
RESULT 3:  Getting the teaser stone is somehow fundamentally different from winning the final stone in the 
on-mid teaser case. 
To see this, first we take the difference between the first and second times the subjects grabbed the teaser 
stone (column ―deltaT‖).  Restating Result 1 above, if our subjects are learning to take the teaser rather 
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than happening upon it randomly, then we should see very little (if any) time pass between the first and 
second rounds in which they take the teaser.  We test the null hypothesis that the number of rounds 
between the first and second ―takes‖ is less than the number of rounds between the start of the game and 
their first take.  The results of this hypothesis test tell us that subjects are not getting the teaser by 
accident; however, subjects playing the on-mid teaser game take longer to get their second teaser than in 
any other experimental condition.  Next, we compare the number of rounds between the first and second 
time subjects take the final stone to win the game (column ―deltaF‖).  Here, the on-mid treatment when 
the action space is (1-3) shows a significant advantage over the no-teaser control, conditional on subjects 
learning the game at all (less than one round on average between the first and second wins, compared to 
over four rounds).  Only the off-mid (1-4) treatment comes close, and that is complicated by the fact that 
the average first win comes over two rounds later in the game for the latter treatment.  Similarly, 
although the differences between first and second wins for both the on-mid (1-4) and no-teaser (1-4) 
treatments are nearly identical, the subjects playing the on-mid (1-4) game first play the winning strategy 
over five rounds sooner.  Finally, we test the null hypothesis that the deltaT-to-second-teaser ratio is the 
same as the deltaF-to-second-win ratio.  In all cases we are able to reject the null hypothesis, although 
the difference between the ratios in the on-mid treatment is only weakly significant (p=0.096).  So, we 
conclude from this analysis that the combination of an on-equilibrium teaser with the teaser located near 
the middle of the game offers significant advantages over every other condition we tested in the 
laboratory. 
3. Ranking conditions for speed of learning 
 
In Result 1 we asserted that just because a subject wins one round, does not necessarily mean he 
learned the optimal path.  We recorded numerous observations in which a subject won his first round, 
and then failed to win for several rounds in a row before getting back to the equilibrium path of play.  
Then it cannot be the case that the first round the subject won provides evidence that learning has taken 
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place.  With that in mind, we need a more robust definition of learning in the context of the Race to 21 
game.  Our new and improved definition of learning has two parts: (1) once learned, there cannot be 
gaps of more than two consecutive rounds lost, and (2) learning starts with two sequential rounds won.  
According to this new definition of learning, we rank the various teaser conditions and report the results 
in Table 15.  
Using Table 10 exclusively for all of our analysis leaves out a crucial part of the story.  While it 
is advantageous for hypothesis testing, analyzing the data conditional on observing a subject taking a 
teaser and/or final stone fails to account for sample size in each treatment.  To see why this is potentially 
problematic, notice that if a treatment is particularly difficult, then only the fastest (smartest?) fraction of 
subjects ever learn the path to either the teaser or the final stone.  Taking the average of the first round in 
which that happens tells us nothing about how many were actually able to solve the game.  Thus we 
cannot compare the average number of rounds to getting stone 21 across treatments.  The average may 
be artificially low if the slower players are sorted out. 
 One way of correcting for this problem, mentioned earlier, requires calculating an unconditional 
average for each treatment.  In doing so, we made the conservative assumption that any subject whom 
we did not observe ever playing the winning strategy would be arbitrarily assigned a win in round 31.  
While this assumption gave us higher average first-take rounds for some games than they were in the 
conditional analysis, we still have difficulty in assessing the magnitude of differences between treatments.  
 To get at the magnitude among rankings, we posit the following model.  Consider a game 
without a teaser, and let F(t) be the fraction of people who learn the game before or during round t.  
Then 1 – F(30) is the fraction of people who never win the game because they are cut off after 30 rounds.  




t), where the superscript Ts represent the 
particular teaser positions (i.e., on/off and early/mid) being compared.  Now suppose that in the 
no-teaser treatment a fraction x of the n subjects learn the game by period t.  These are the fast xn of the 
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n subjects.  With some teasers (e.g., on-mid) it will take them less time to learn the game, so that same 
fraction x will learn the game by period βt, where, if the game is easier, β is less than one.  If we took a 
harder treatment, like off-early, we might get β greater than one.  Now let us assume that the β value is 
the same for all choices of t.  So, if it takes twice as long for the fastest people, it also takes twice as long 
for the slow people.  Likewise, if it takes half as long for the fast people, it takes half as long for the slow 
people.   
If we have a harder treatment, everyone is slower, the slowest ones need more than thirty rounds, 
and we get fewer people solving the game.  This might lead to a faster average learning time, though.  
To see why, suppose that in the ―easy‖ treatment we get five people solving the game (one each in rounds 
one through four and one in round twenty).  The average first-win occurs in round six.  If the hard 
treatment makes everybody take twice as long, the fifth person never solves the game and we are left with 
four people who solve it in rounds two, four, six, and eight; thus, the average first-win round is five, 
which appears to be faster than in the easy treatment.  However we know this cannot be the case, since it 
takes twice as long to solve the game in the harder treatment. 
Now we have a way to estimate how difficult a game is.  We do this by arranging the data in 
such a way to compare the earliest round in which the fastest player learned the game across treatments 
(according to our new definition of learning), then we find the first round in which the next-fastest player 
learned the game for each treatment, then do it again for the third-fastest player, and so on (Table 11). 
According to our theory, in order to calculate the relative difficulty level between treatments (or 
β) we regress each experimental treatment (one column from Table 11) against its no-teaser strategy 
space analog, suppressing the constant term
13
.  We test the null hypothesis that both treatments are of 
equal difficulty (β=1).  If we reject in favor of β < 1, the experimental treatment is easier than the control 
                                                          
13
 Note the disadvantage to using this method: the OLS regression requires the same number of observations on the 
dependent and independent variables.  Therefore not all of the data is used; i.e., when testing each treatment against 
its analogous no-teaser control, the observations are truncated at whichever has the lesser number. 
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because it takes less time for the same fraction of subjects to learn it.  If we reject in favor of β > 1, the 
experimental treatment is harder than the control.  The magnitude of the regression coefficient tells us 
how much easier or harder each teaser makes the decision problem, allowing us to rank the treatments. 
 The results of each regression are presented in Tables 12 and 13.  In Table 12, we regress the 
teaser treatment on its no-teaser analog, under the assumption that all subjects who never solved the game 
in thirty rounds would have done so in the 31
st
 round.  In both the (1-3) and (1-4) strategy space games, 
the on-mid teaser proves to speed up learning the most relative to the no-teaser option, followed by the 
on-early teaser condition.  When subjects choose from one to three stones, the off-mid treatment is not 
significantly harder or easier to solve than its no-teaser analog.  Likewise, the on-early, no-teaser, 
off-mid, and off-early teaser conditions are equally easy to solve in the (1-4) version.  The relatively 
high R
2
 values indicate that our theory works well with the data. 
 In Table 13, we treat the data slightly differently to test the robustness of our theory.  Assigning 
a value of 31 to all subjects we never observed winning the final stone is useful to the extent that we do 
not artificially lower the average speed of learning; however, it turns out that in Table 12 we end up 
regressing a lot of 31s against 31s.  This makes our coefficients closer to one, thus we have a lot of 
insignificant differences.  Another alternative way to treat the data is to match the columns in Table 11 
until both have coinciding 31s.  This has the effect of reducing our sample size, but precludes the bias 
toward one in the coefficients.  We report the results of this regression in Table 13.  Notice that the 
on-mid teaser combination regression coefficients are identical in this treatment, and still win out over all 
other combinations tested.   
 These results, while helpful in that they offer evidence that some teaser treatments may make the 
game easier to learn than others, still suffer from the problem of including ―false-positive‖ observations 
(i.e., assigning a win in round 31 to those whom we never observe winning).  Then perhaps the 
appropriate comparison to make is among those subjects who would have learned the optimum strategy 
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for any treatment.  We shall call these the fastest twenty percent
14
 of subjects in each treatment.  Table 
14 illustrates the top twenty percent of first-win observations taken from Table 11 above.  Examining the 
fastest twenty percent of subjects, it seems that for the (1-3) version of the game, the on-early treatment 
proved easier than any other, followed closely by the on-mid and no-teaser treatments.  Similarly, the 
fastest subjects found the off-early treatment easiest to solve, followed by the on-mid and on-early 
treatments.  Table 15 provides a summary of our rankings under each method of analysis. 
 Under our new definition for learning, the (1-3) on-early and on-mid treatments swap ranks under 
the fastest twenty percent test.  Additionally, the no-teaser, off-early, and off-mid treatments vary in 
their rank by the strategy space of the game and the method of data analysis.  The most important result 
to take from this robustness check is that the on-mid treatment proves to speed up learning more than any 
other treatment under the majority of testing methods addressed, lending further support for the 
superiority of this teaser combination.  The rankings illustrated in Table 15 allow us to summarize the 
data in the following way: 
RESULT 4:  Offering a teaser payment in the on-mid position is the consensus fastest way to induce 
learning relative to the no-teaser control treatment in the Race to 21 game.  However, rankings among all 
treatments are sensitive to the method of analysis. 
4. Conclusion 
  
Looking at the data collected in our Race to 21 laboratory experiment, we report several insights 
into how the speed of learning may be affected based on the location of an intermediate incentive 
payment.  We find that combining an on-equilibrium incentive payment with the mid-game location is 
unique for several reasons.  First, once a subject learns how to find the optimal path of play from the first 
stone to the teaser stone via backward induction, learning the optimal path to solve the game occurs 
                                                          
14
 We chose to test the fastest 20% (rather than 10% or 30%) by counting the smallest number of observations we have 
for any treatment and dividing by the number of subjects who participated in said treatment.  We only observed two 
out of eleven subjects ever winning the off-early (1-3) treatment, which represents 20% of those who played. 
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nearly instantaneously.  The same is not true for any other experimental condition.  Additionally, we 
find that for some reason, learning to get the teaser stone is somehow fundamentally different from 
learning to get the final stone in the on-mid teaser case.  Subjects playing the on-mid game take longer to 
get their second teaser, while they need much fewer rounds to grab their second final stone, than any other 
experimental treatment tested.  Finally, we show that although these results are sensitive to the method 
of analysis tested, the superiority of the on-mid teaser treatment holds in aggregate. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  WHAT FACTORS PREDICT BACKWARD INDUCTION, AND TO WHAT DEGREE? 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated that subjects learn how to solve the Race to 21 game over 
time.  Further, we showed that the speed of learning is affected by the position of incentive payments 
within the structure of the game.  Specifically, unlike any other teaser condition, placing an incentive on 
the equilibrium path near the midpoint of the game allows for backward induction to transfer almost 
instantaneously once a subject has learned the path to the teaser stone.  Finally, we discussed how learning 
to get the teaser stone is somehow fundamentally different from learning to win the game for only the 
on-mid teaser experimental condition. 
The data we use in this essay comes from the same set of Race to 21 experiments that we analyzed 
in previous chapters.  As in previous chapters, we analyze the effect that various ―teaser‖ incentive 
payments had on backward induction.  However, in this study we add to the analysis demographic 
variables (i.e., age, gender, number of economics courses taken, and the number of economic experiments a 
subject previously participated in), as well as the results of a simple cognitive ability/patience battery to test 
whether, and if so to what degree, these factors predict backward induction in our decision task. 
2. The Data 
 
Subject Pool  
Before reporting the results of demographic effects on backward induction, first it is necessary to 
have a good idea of the characteristics of our subject pool.  As in the first two essays, we report on 179 
undergraduate student subjects, of whom 74 are female and 105 are male.  They range in age from eighteen 
to forty-three, with a mean age of 21.43 and median twenty.  Figure 2 depicts age distribution via 
histogram.   
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In addition to age and gender, we asked subjects to report the number of economics courses they 
had taken at the university level, as well as whether they had participated in economics experiments 
previous to this one
15
.  Nearly twenty-five percent of all subjects report they had never taken a single 
economics course, and the vast majority of our subjects (59.78%) have taken one economics course
16
.  The 
remaining 15.64% of subjects report taking anywhere from two to fifteen
17
 economics courses at the 
university level.  Additionally, 141 of 179 subjects (78.77%) report having previously participated in an 
economics experiment.   
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
In addition to the demographic variables mentioned above, our subjects also faced a series of three 
questions designed to measure cognitive ability and patience
18
, displayed in Figure 3.  Frederick (2005) 
discusses the difference between the ―intuitive‖ (and wrong) answers impulsive and/or unintelligent 
subjects give (ten cents, 100 minutes, and 24 days), and the correct responses given by subjects with a 
higher proclivity for computation (five cents, five minutes, and 47 days).  His collective analysis of 
previous literature demonstrates a strong enough correlation between those who get the CRT questions 
correct and those with high scores on standardized tests of intelligence to conclude the CRT functions as a 
good test of cognitive ability.  Additionally, his own results show that those who scored high on the CRT 
also made decisions which implied low discount rates of time preference, offering evidence of a positive 
relationship between cognitive ability and patience. 
                                                          
15
 We also have data on each subject’s academic major as well as their responses to a 42-question personality-type 
survey.  Future work along these dimensions should prove most enlightening. 
16
 Apparently introductory economics is not a graduation requirement to earn an undergraduate degree from the 
University of Tennessee.  Rather, there is a ―social science‖ general education requirement that students may satisfy 
by taking two courses from a list of twenty-one offered in Africana, Anthropology, Child and Family Studies, 
Economics, Geography, Political Science, Psychology, Sociology, and Women’s Studies.  That more than half of our 
subjects have taken at least one economics course may be due to some economics instructors calling attention to the 
registration process for ORSEE (web-based lab management software) in class. 
17
 The economics major requires only ten economics courses to graduate.  Methinks fifteen a dubious claim. 
18
 These questions are borrowed from Frederick (2005).  He finds that CRT scores are predictive of the types of 
choices that feature prominently in tests of decision-making theories, e.g. expected utility or prospect theory. 
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 Our subjects were required to answer the CRT questions as part of a survey they completed after all 
rounds of the Race to 21 game were complete (the computer was programmed in such a way that their final 
score would not be displayed until all survey questions were accomplished).  To make their responses 
salient, subjects were paid an additional fifty cents for each correct answer.  Summary statistics on the 
CRT responses appear in Table 16.  It is interesting to note that while nearly one-third of subjects failed to 
calculate a correct answer in any of the three questions, more than twenty percent in our sample came up 
with the correct answer to all three questions
19
.   
3. Estimation Strategy 
  
We assume that if a subject learned how to solve the Race to 21 game via backward induction at all, 
then he should have won the final round of the game.  Therefore, our first measure of learning backward 
induction is whether he won or lost the game in round thirty.  Using this binary outcome as our limited 
dependent variable, we report the results of a series of four marginal effects probit regressions to measure 
the degree to which experimental condition, demographic information about subjects, and subject 
performance on a cognitive ability/patience battery predict backward induction in our decision task.  As a 
test of robustness, we regress via ordinary least squares (OLS) all of the same right hand side variables 
against the total number of points scored in all thirty rounds of the game.  Each model tested is presented 
below, where we substitute ―Total Points‖ for P(wini,30) on the left hand side in our second (OLS) set of 
tests: 
 Teaser treatment effects: 
𝑃 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖 ,30 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽2 𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽4 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 
+ 𝛽7 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽8 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽9 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽10 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝜀𝑖 ,30  
 
 Teaser treatment, demographic effects: 
                                                          
19
 The twenty percent who got all three questions here is slightly higher than the seventeen percent that Frederick 
found in his study, though his sample is far larger. 
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𝑃 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖 ,30 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽2 𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽4 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 
+ 𝛽7 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽8 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽9 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽10 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 
+ 𝛽11 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽12 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽13 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣. 𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽14 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛. 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,30  
 
 Teaser treatment, cognitive battery effects: 
𝑃 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖 ,30 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽2 𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽4 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 
+ 𝛽7 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽8 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽9 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽10 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 
+ 𝛽11 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽12 𝑙𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛽13 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,30  
 
 Teaser treatment, demographic effects, cognitive battery effects: 
𝑃 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖 ,30 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽2 𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽4 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽5 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 
+ 𝛽7 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽8 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽9 𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 + 𝛽10 𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 ∗ 1𝑡𝑜3 
+ 𝛽11 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽12 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽13 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣. 𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽14 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛. 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽15 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽16 𝑙𝑎𝑘𝑒 
+ 𝛽17(𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖 ,30  
 
The goal of this estimation method is twofold.  First, we want to determine how much more variation each 
model is explaining over and above the baseline teaser treatment effects.  Second, among the demographic 
and cognitive battery variables, we want to know precisely which regressor is picking up the biggest effect 
on backward induction.  The results of our analysis will tell us the answers to both. 
4. Results 
 
We begin the analysis of our results by looking at how well our models explain the variation in the 
experimental data.  Table 17 shows the respective R
2
 values for each regression form.  The baseline 
marginal effects probit model we posit explains 14% of the variation in the probability a subject will win 
round thirty, while the analogous baseline OLS regression accounts for 23% of variability in total points 
earned by subjects.  To analyze how much more variation is explained away by adding demographic 
information, we take the difference between the second and first columns.  This difference tells us that 
adding demographic information accounts for an additional 8.5% of variation in the probit, and an 
additional 10.21% in the OLS model.  Likewise, we want to compare the baseline to the model in which 
we include the cognitive ability/patience battery.  Here, the latter adds 17.97% explanatory power to the 
baseline probit, and adds 23.85% to the OLS baseline.  These values suggest our first result: 
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RESULT 1:  The cognitive ability/patience battery is better able to predict backward induction than simple 
demographic information.   
Running a test on ―all of the above‖ regressors indicates a marginal improvement in explanatory power over 
the cognitive ability probit model, and a larger but still modest increase over the cognitive battery in the 
OLS version
20
.   
 Tables 18 and 19 provide the results of each probit and OLS regression run using the data specified 
in section 2 of this essay.  The leftmost column identifies the pertinent regressors, and each subsequent 
column contains the coefficients on those independent variables included in each model.  Recognizing that 
it is necessary to calculate linear combinations to ascertain the marginal effects of each teaser treatment on 
backward induction, we present those marginal effects that correspond to the ―f(Treatment)‖ column in 
Tables 18a and 19a.  These will serve as our baselines for comparison.   
 Recall that in the first essay we employed the same marginal effects probit model on all 
observations over thirty rounds of our race game.  Comparing the results in Table 9 to Table 18a below 
(using data on round thirty only), we see the coefficients are very similar in direction and magnitude, 
allowing us to re-state the following result from our first essay: 
RESULT 2:  On-equilibrium-path teasers make backward induction easier; more specifically, on-mid 
teasers are superior to any other combination; and fewer decision nodes are preferable to more, even if 
there are more alternatives to choose from at each node. 
The similarity between Tables 9 and 18a also implies that the relative degree to which different teaser 
treatments affect success in backward induction is unlikely to vary across the four models we present in this 
essay, regardless of which other independent variables we include.  Therefore, for ease of exposition of the 
remaining probit results we will take the teaser treatment relationships as given and discuss only the 
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 It should be noted that adding more independent variables to a model necessarily increases R
2
; however, the 
relatively large jump in R
2
 we get from adding demographic and cognitive battery information to the baseline model 
suggests the chance we are overfitting the model is negligible. 
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demographic and cognitive battery effects. 
 Following our baseline regressions, we test whether four demographic variables (age, gender, 
previous experiments, and number of economics courses) predict backward induction.  In both the 
marginal effects probit and the OLS regression, age proves a positive but insignificant predictor of 
backward induction.   However, that is not to say that age cannot predict backward induction necessarily.  
Our results are complicated by the fact that our subject pool consists only of undergraduate students; recall 
that Figure 2 displays a tight age distribution of our subjects.  In fact two-thirds of our sample is nineteen, 
twenty, or 21 years old.  Likewise, having participated in previous economics experiments demonstrates a 
positive, but not significantly different from zero, prediction for backward induction in both the probit and 
OLS measures.   
 Analyzing Tables 18 and 19 for demographic variables that serve as significant predictors of 
backward induction leads to the following insight: 
RESULT 3:  Females find solving the Race to 21 game via backward induction more difficult than do males. 
From Table 18, we see that when demographics are included on the right hand side with experimental 
conditions, female subjects are 37% less likely to successfully win the game than males.  Similarly, when 
included in our ―all of the above‖ model, females are 25% less likely to use backward induction than males.  
Our robustness test results in Table 19 show the same negative and highly significant relationship.  
Frederick (2005) found very similar gender effects in his CRT study, and suggests that the gender gap may 
exist because men might be better at quantitative endeavors
21
.   
 Also significant is the coefficient on the number of economics courses a student has taken.  
Specifically, the results of our tests imply that taking economics courses negatively relates to the propensity 
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 Larry Summers’ infamous and intensely controversial hypothesis regarding gender disparity in tenure-track science 
and engineering positions at top research institutions pointed to high variability in IQ scores between men and women, 
similarly suggesting that some men may have an intrinsic aptitude advantage. 
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to use backward induction.  While these results are significantly different from zero in three out of four 
models tested, they are likely biased by the fact that 84% of our sample have zero or only one economics 
course under their belts.  Since undergraduate students can hardly be taught how to think strategically in a 
single principles course (much less if they have never taken a class in economics at the university level), it 
is not likely that this variable tells us much that is meaningful. 
 Finally, analysis of the results on the inclusion of the cognitive ability/patience battery leads to the 
following result: 
RESULT 4:  Correctly answering the “ball” and “lake” questions from Frederick’s CRT survey predicts 
backward induction in the Race to 21 game. 
Specifically, the ―lake‖ question is a far better predictor of backward induction than the ―ball‖ question, 
although both coefficients are large and significant.  Answering the lake question correctly increases the 
probability that a subject will win the final stone by over forty percent, compared to nearly 25% for 
answering the ball question correctly.  Likewise, testing our OLS model for cognitive battery effects 
shows that calculating the correct answer to the lake problem leads to an increase of over 1,100 total points 
earned over the entire game, compared to an increase of over 700 points for providing the right answer to 
the ball question.  Curiously, the prediction value of the ―widget‖ problem in our Race to 21 game, while 
positive, proved insignificantly different from zero.  One possible explanation for this is fatigue, as it is 
among the last questions our subjects are faced with in a fairly strenuous decision task lasting 
approximately 45 minutes.  However, considering the lake question appeared just after the widget 
question, fatigue is unlikely to be the reason that particular question was missed so often.  In the future, it 
would be interesting to switch the order in which subjects read the problems to see if this effect holds
22
. 
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 Frederick (2005) does not report how subjects performed on each problem in his CRT studies—only how many 




 Analyzing our Race to 21 game data after accounting for demographic variables and the results of a 
cognitive ability and patience battery allows us to report several insights into what factors may predict 
backward induction.  Our analysis reinforces the results of the first essay in this study, in that teaser 
placement within the structure of the race game predict backward induction based on their location relative 
to the equilibrium path of play.  Further, we find that certain demographic variables predict backward 
induction, namely gender (females struggle with backward induction more than males) and to a lesser 
extent the number of economics courses one has taken at the university level (though for reasons we 
discussed, this effect may not be as significant as it appears).  Finally, we find that two of the three 
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1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
 
2. If it takes five machines five minutes to make five widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half the lake? 
 








(Teaser On/Off Equilibrium) 
Control (No Teaser) 1-3 





















































No T (1-3) 
(n=360) 
.96 .88 .81 .58 .46 
No T (1-4) 
[n=630] 
.97 .88 .64 .54 
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 The conditional probabilities at each node are not statistically different from one another depending on action space, 
except for those at node ―Final-2‖, which are different at the 99% confidence level per two-sample test of proportions. 
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TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF ALL ROUNDS WON 
Percentage of all rounds won
24
 
   
Teaser location within the game 
(n) 













[1-3] 0.45 0.54 
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 The statistical significance of each comparison will be addressed in turn.  All comparisons are made using a 
two-sample test of proportions, unless otherwise noted. 
25
 In the (1-4) treatment, it turns out that putting the teaser payment on stone 5 actually serves no purpose but to 
frustrate the subject.  Suppose the subject selects stone 1 to begin on the equilibrium path.  Then the computer is 
programmed to take the teaser on 5, since it’s available and the subject has not yet deviated from the equilibrium path.  
If, instead, the subject takes stones 2, 3, or 4, the computer will skip the teaser on 5 to move to the equilibrium path and 
take stone 6.  Either way, it’s impossible for the subject to get the teaser.  Although a perfect backward inductor 
should see this game in the same way as a no-teaser setting, the fact remains that the early-off teaser yields better 
results than no teaser (42% > 30%).  It could be that merely having a teaser present induces more/better backward 
induction vs. forward-looking behavior.  
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on 0.52 2,520 







TABLE 5: STATA OUTPUT 1.1 








P(win=1) = 0.359 
Independent Variables: 
Marginal 
Effect t stat p>|t| 
on 
  
0.340 17.78 0.000 
off 
  
-0.083 -4.25 0.000 
on*early 
  
-0.162 -8.98 0.000 
off*early 
  
0.085 3.92 0.000 














mid .39 2,460 0.000 
early
27
 .35 1,560 0.000 
none .25 990  
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 Mid and early are also significantly different from each other. 
27
 Excluding (1-4) off-early, for the reasons discussed in an earlier footnote. 
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(1-3) 0.33 2,400 







TABLE 8: STATA OUTPUT 1.2 
 








Observed P: 0.3594 





 z stat p>|z| x-bar 
a) 1to3     -0.1317 -3.91 0.000 0.4469 
b) on     0.3283 12.71 0.000 0.4693 
c) off     -0.1634 -5.96 0.000 0.3464 
d) on*early   -0.2023 -8.40 0.000 0.2291 
e) off*early   0.3094 9.33 0.000 0.1341 
f) on*1to3     0.0284 0.66 0.511 0.2346 
g) off*1to3     0.1895 3.83 0.000 0.1453 
h) on*early*1to3   0.1533 3.96 0.000 0.1229 
i) off*early*1to3   -0.3367 -9.54 0.000 0.0615 
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 Marginal effect = dF/dx for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
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On-Early On-Mid Off-Early Off-Mid 
(1-3) vs. No Teaser 
(b+d+f+h) (b+f) (c+e+g+i) (c+g) 
0.3077* 0.3567* -0.0012 0.0261 
(1-4) vs. No Teaser 
(b+d) (b) (c+e) (c) 
0.1260* 0.3283* 0.1460* -0.1634* 
(1-3) vs. (1-4) 
(a+f+h) (a+f) (a+g+i) (a+g) 
0.0500 -0.1033* -0.2789* 0.0578 













































(1-3) 1.27 2.45 1.18 0.246 0.91 
 





(1-4) 2.32 3.53 1.21 0.058 0.84 
 







6.90 8.35 1.45 0.182 0.54 
 
7.05 7.94 0.89 0.202 0.54 0.720 
   
0.15 
 
6.90 11.75 4.85 0.098 
  








4.81 7.62 2.81 0.028 0.68 
 
5.10 8.62 3.52 0.040 0.65 0.000 
   
0.29 
 
6.48 9.52 3.04 0.026 
  









1.27 2.73 1.46 0.253 0.65 
 
14.00 19.50 5.50 0.155 0.06 0.085 
   
12.73 
 
      








--- --- --- --- --- 
 
5.90 10.78 4.88 0.378 0.42 0.021 
   
--- 
 
      
11.69 17.23 5.54 0.096 
 
0.053 
     
Off-Mid 
(1-3) 
6.82 9.10 2.28 0.017 0.25 
 
17.20 18.75 1.55 0.001 0.19 0.009 
   
10.38 
 
13.27 16.67 3.40 0.010 
  








1.52 3.35 1.83 0.087 0.46 
 
9.63 9.60 -0.03 0.381 0.16 0.419 
   
8.11 
 
      









(1-3)       
6.00 10.33 4.33 0.356 0.18 
    
6 
 
      
22.67 26.50 3.83 0.003 
     
22.67 0.000 
(1-4)       
10.17 13.91 3.74 0.005 0.30 
    
10.17 
 
      
19.57 22.48 2.91 0.000 
     
19.57 0.000 
Pdelta<1st:  1-tail, paired t-test          
P1st=NoTeaser: 2-tail, unpaired t-test          
*Unconditional = for any treatment in which a subject never got it, we conservatively assume they would have gotten it in round 31. 
                                                          
29
 In a simple paired t-test for means, we test the null hypothesis that delta=1.  We reject the null in all treatments. 
30
 In a simple paired t-test for means, we test the null hypothesis that delta=1.  We reject the null in all treatments. 
31




 Teaser)=0.  We reject the null hypothesis in all treatments except on-mid (1-3). 
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TABLE 11: FINAL STONE-1ST "REDEFINED" WIN 
Final stone-1
st
 Redefined "win" 
On-Early On-Mid Off-Early Off-Mid No Teaser 
(1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) 
1 1 3 1 14 1 11 4 3 6 
1 1 3 1 29 1 16 5 10 7 
1 1 3 2 31 1 19 8 16 9 
1 8 5 3 31 14 20 11 31 10 
2 8 5 3 31 16 22 23 31 14 
5 14 6 4 31 16 23 31 31 15 
9 19 6 5 31 18 23 31 31 17 
13 22 6 6 31 26 31 31 31 17 
14 22 8 6 31 31 31 31 31 18 
21 27 9 7 31 31 31 31 31 23 
25 27 12 8 31 31 31 31 31 31 
25 31 18 8 - 31 31 31 31 31 
27 31 18 8 - 31 31 31 - 31 
28 31 22 11 - - 31 31 - 31 
31 31 31 12 - - 31 31 - 31 
31 31 31 16 - - - 31 - 31 
31 31 31 19 - - - 31 - 31 
31 31 31 21 - - - 31 - 31 
31 31 31 23 - - - 31 - 31 
31 - 31 23 - - - 31 - 31 
31 - - 31 - - - 31 - 31 
31 - - 31 - - - 31 - - 




TABLE 12: REGRESSION RESULTS-UNCONDITIONAL 
Regression results: Unconditional (31 for all unobserved subjects)
32
 
(*significantly different from 1) 
 
y x β SE R
2
 n 
(1-3) on-mid noT 0.2676* 0.0392 0.8088 12 
 
on-early noT 0.3987* 0.0862 0.6604 12 
 
off-mid noT 0.8908 0.0578 0.9557 12 
 
off-early noT 1.0575* 0.0919 0.9298 11 
(1-4) on-mid noT 0.4885* 0.0522 0.8141 21 
 
on-early noT 0.9903 0.0353 0.9776 19 
 
off-mid noT 1.0973 0.0579 0.9472 21 
 
off-early noT 1.1054 0.8122 0.9378 13 
 
  
                                                          
32
 Boxes surrounding treatments in this and all subsequent tables indicate indifference. 
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TABLE 13: REGRESSION RESULTS-CONDITIONAL 
Regression results: Conditional (truncated at coinciding 31s) 
(*significantly different from 1) 
  y x β SE R
2
 n 
(1-3) on-mid noT 0.2676* 0.0392 0.8088 12 
  on-early noT 0.3987* 0.0862 0.6604 12 
  off-mid noT 0.8097* 0.0834 0.9309 8 
  off-early noT 1.3492 0.3703 0.8157 4 
(1-4) on-mid noT 0.4885* 0.0522 0.8141 21 
  on-early noT 0.9743 0.0735 0.9410 12 
  off-early noT 1.1712 0.1097 0.9193 11 












 round learned-Top 20% 
On-Early On-Mid Off-Early Off-Mid No Teaser 
(1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) (1-3) (1-4) 
1 1 3 1 14 1 11 4 3 6 
  1 1 3 1 29 1 16 5 10 7 
  1 1 3 2 - 1 19 8 - 9 
  1 8 5 3 - - - 11 - 10 
  - - - 3 - - - 23 - - 
Avg 1 2.8 3.5 2 21.5 1 15.3 10.2 6.5 8 
















round (Table 1) 
(1-3) 1 on-mid on-mid on early on-mid 
 
2 on-early on-early on-mid on-early 
 
3 off-mid off-mid no-teaser off-mid 
 
4 no-teaser no-teaser off-mid no-teaser 
 
5 off-early off-early off-early off-early 
(1-4) 1 on-mid on-mid off-early on-mid 
 
2 on-early on-early on-mid on-early 
 
3 no-teaser no-teaser on-early off-early 
 
4 off-early off-mid no-teaser no-teaser 
 





TABLE 16: CRT-CORRECT ANSWERS 
CRT: correct answers 
  Frequency 
% of 
subjects 
Lake 97 0.54 
Ball 82 0.46 
Widget 59 0.33 
Ball+Lake 60 0.34 
Lake+Widget 50 0.28 
Ball+Widget 43 0.24 
All 3 correct 38 0.21 




















cognitive battery)  
 
Probit (Win) 0.1407 0.2256 0.3204 0.3606 





TABLE 18: MARGINAL EFFECTS PROBIT 












-0.2414              
(0.200) 
-0.3280*           
(0.093) 
-0.0338            
(0.876) 
-0.0983           
(0.659) 
(b) on 
0.4444***               
(0.006) 
0.3752**             
(0.031) 
0.5835***             
(0.001) 
0.5369***             
(0.005) 
(c) off 
-0.2813*             
(0.072) 
-0.4302***           
(0.009) 
-0.3629**           
(0.035) 
-0.4609**           
(0.011) 
(d) on*early 
-0.3502**             
(0.035) 
-0.3239*           
(0.071) 
-0.3563*           
(0.068) 
-0.3511*           
(0.089) 
(e) off*early 
0.3727**               
(0.019) 
0.4350***             
(0.008) 
0.4964***             
(0.002) 
0.5093***             
(0.002) 
(f) on*1to3 
0.0059               
(0.982) 
0.0531             
(0.847) 
-0.3186           
(0.274) 
-0.2846           
(0.353) 
(g) off*1to3 
0.4336**               
(0.043) 
0.5096**             
(0.014) 
0.3832             
(0.117) 
0.4382*             
(0.066) 
(h) on*early*1to3 
0.2372               
(0.289) 
0.2320             
(0.327) 
0.1695             
(0.505) 
0.1905             
(0.466) 
(i) off*early*1to3 
-0.5271***              
(0.008) 
-0.5663***           
(0.002) 
-0.5573**           
(0.010) 
-0.5873***            
(0.005) 
gender - 
-0.3676***           
(0.000) 
- 
-0.2486**            
(0.011) 
age - 
0.0038             
(0.748) 
- 
0.0026             
(0.840) 
prev. experiments - 
0.1355             
(0.191) 
- 
0.0865             
(0.450) 
econ courses - 
-0.0389            
(0.120) 
- 
-0.0550**           
(0.045) 
ball - - 
0.2497**             
(0.010) 
0.2454**             
(0.017) 
lake - - 
0.4231***             
(0.000) 
0.4007***             
(0.000) 
widget - - 
0.0822             
(0.450) 







On-Early On-Mid Off-Early Off-Mid 
(1-3) vs. No Teaser 
(b+d+f+h) (b+f) (c+e+g+i) (c+g) 
0.3373** 0.4503*** -0.0021 0.1523 
(1-4) vs. No Teaser 
(b+d) (b) (c+e) (c) 
0.0942 0.4444*** 0.0914 -0.2813* 
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TABLE 19: OLS-TOTAL POINTS 












-604.7619         
(0.283) 
-905.7305*       
(0.095) 
161.1973        
(0.738) 
-130.2171       
(0.786) 
(b) on 
2236.5420***          
(0.000) 
1875.2630***      
(0.000) 
2334.5440***      
(0.000) 
2125.8470***      
(0.000) 
(c) off 
688.7164          
(0.143) 
313.8169        
(0.490) 
720.8602*        
(0.069) 
534.8416        
(0.177) 
(d) on*early 
-575.5149         
(0.233) 
-411.0410       
(0.370) 
-222.3133       
(0.593) 
-195.2261       
(0.631) 
(e) off*early 
502.6756          
(0.352) 
593.9525        
(0.248) 
773.7315*        
(0.092) 
741.7474*        
(0.099) 
(f) on*1to3 
100.9576          
(0.891) 
334.1922        
(0.634) 
-776.1969        
(0.219) 
-541.6589       
(0.385) 
(g) off*1to3 
914.6170          
(0.232) 
1317.3930*      
(0.073) 
300.1094        
(0.642) 
606.6432        
(0.344) 
(h) on*early*1to3 
674.3785          
(0.322) 
625.0268        
(0.333) 
226.4560        
(0.693) 
303.7275        
(0.587) 
(i) off*early*1to3 
-869.6453         
(0.289) 
-1149.7260     
(0.143) 
-549.4719       
(0.434) 
-721.5144       
(0.297) 
gender - 
-1053.2750***       
(0.000) 
- 
-526.4939**       
(0.013) 
age - 
42.4044               
(0.212) 
- 
36.1500          
(0.220) 
prev. experiments - 
315.6775         
(0.259) 
- 
55.6498          
(0.819) 
econ courses - 
-149.1424**       
(0.022) 
- 
-170.6020***         
(0.003) 
ball - - 
711.0321***        
(0.002) 
707.9256***        
(0.002) 
lake - - 
1215.9400***          
(0.000) 
1154.219***        
(0.000) 
widget - - 
311.8999        
(0.205) 
188.2037        
(0.435) 
(j) constant 
1604.762***          
(0.000) 
1360.9760*      
(0.090) 
331.0680        
(0.304) 







On-Early On-Mid Off-Early Off-Mid 
(1-3) vs. No Teaser 
(b+d+f+h+j) (b+f+j) (c+e+g+i+j) (c+g+j) 
4041.126 3942.260 2841.126 3208.095 
(1-4) vs. No Teaser 
(b+d+j) (b+j) (c+e+j) (c+j) 
3265.789 3841.304 2796.154 2293.478 
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Welcome to the UT Experimental Economics Laboratory.  My name is Kelly Padden, and joining me 
today is _________.  We are researchers from the Department of Economics.  We understand that many 
of you have busy schedules and really appreciate your willingness to participate. 
Before we begin I need to go over a few lab rules.  Once the experiment begins, please refrain from 
communicating with each other (talking, texting) and please do not open or play any games on the computer 
(no solitaire or minesweeper). 
In this study, you will be asked to make a series of market-like decisions.  Your earnings in this experiment 
are based on the decisions you make.  The money you will be paid with comes from a research grant, and 
this money can only be used to pay experiment participants.  You will be paid in cash after the experiment 
is completed. 
The decision-making setting may be unfamiliar to you.  This is common.  Therefore, in writing the 
instructions for this experiment, we have done our very best to clearly describe to you all relevant 
information from which to base your decisions. 
There are two important protocols in experimental economics that we would like you to be aware of.  First, 
the instructions contain only true information.  There are no hidden tasks, and the experiment works 
exactly as stated in the instructions.  Second, your decisions are confidential.  What this means is that you 
have been randomly assigned an ID number.  All decisions you make will be associated with this ID 
number and not your name.  Therefore, when we analyze the data and present results, your name will in no 
way be affiliated with this study. 
We have provided everyone with a pencil, calculator, and paper.  Use these items, if you wish, as you make 
your decisions.  But please do not write on the instructions. 
Has everyone had a chance to read the informed consent sheet?  Is everyone comfortable with the risks 
involved with participation in this experiment?  If you would, please raise your hand to indicate you have 
read the Informed Consent Sheet and you agree to participate in the experiment. 
Today, you will play two experimental games and then answer a short questionnaire.  We will proceed by 
reading the instructions for the first game.  I will read the instructions aloud and ask that you follow along 
on your copy. 
Let’s begin…<read instructions for Race to 21 game> 
After you are finished with the final round of the first game, please DO NOT proceed to the second game.  
We will go through the instructions to the second game as a group before proceeding. 
If any question should arise during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of us will address your 
question privately.  Good luck, and we hope you earn lots of money!  
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Race to 21 game instructions: 
Welcome 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will be playing games against a computer for 
money. You will be paid for your participation in cash, immediately at the end of the experiment. 
How much you earn depends on your decisions. A research foundation has contributed the money 
for this study.  
It is very important that you read all instructions carefully and that you strictly follow the rules of 
this experiment. If you disobey the rules, you will be asked to leave the experiment. You should 
never use the browser's forward or back button. All navigation through this experiment should be 
done by hitting the "proceed" button on each screen. 
Your id number for this experiment is ________. 
 
Do not press the PROCEED button until instructed to do so. 
Rules of the Game 
You will be playing a simple game against a computer opponent. You will see 21 stones, 
numbered 1 through 21. You will move first. On each of your turns, you may remove between 1 
and <3, 4> consecutive stones beginning with the lowest-numbered remaining stone. You will 
remove stones by mousing over the stones you want to remove and clicking on the last stone you 
want to remove. After your turn, the computer will remove between 1 and <3, 4> consecutive 
stones. The stones removed by the computer will flash briefly, and then it will be your turn again. 
You and the computer alternate moves until all of the stones have been removed. 
Profit 
Most of the stones in the game are colored gray but one or more may be colored green. You make 
money when you, and not the computer, click on a green stone. Green stones have boldface 
numbers equal to the number of points that you earn for removing that stone. At the end of the 
experiment, points will be converted into dollars at the rate of $1.00 for every 150 points.  If you 
remove a green stone in passing but without clicking on it, you do NOT earn points on that turn. 
Practice 
On your screen is a panel to help you practice removing stones. In the practice panel, there are only 
8 stones. The last stone is a green stone and has a value of 100 points. You may remove between 1 
and <3, 4> on each turn. Take this opportunity to try removing different numbers of stones. Notice 
that moving your mouse over a stone highlights it and the remaining stones with lower values, but 
that if you try to take more than <3, 4> stones, nothing happens. If you would like more tries, hit 
the RESET button and continue the practice round.  
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To sum up, you will play a game against a computer opponent in which you and the computer will 
alternate removing between 1 and 4 stones until all 8 stones have been removed. If, on your turn, 
you click on a green stone, you will earn the amount written on that stone. 
You will play 30 rounds of this game. Then, you will play 15 rounds of a different game. 
Do not press the "Proceed" button until instructed to do so. 
 
Game 2 
You have finished the first game. You will now play 15 rounds of game 2. 
In game 2, there will be a total of 21 stones. You and the computer will alternate removing between 
1 and <3, 4> stones on each turn. You will go first.  
Practice 
If you wish to practice removing stones, the practice panel on your screen contains 8 stones. You 
may remove between 1 and <3, 4> on each turn. If you would like more tries, hit the RESET button 
and continue the practice round.  
Do not press the "Proceed" button until instructed to do so. 
 
Survey 
Once you have finished the second game, you will complete a brief survey. 
These questions will be used for statistical purposes only.  
THIS INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and WILL BE 
DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION OF THE STUDY.  
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